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Curtis A. Bradley* 
The U.S. executive branch has long declined to recognize any country’s sovereignty over Jerusalem, insisting 
that the matter be worked out through negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The U.S. Congress, by 
contrast, has tended to support Israeli sovereignty over the city. In 2002, Congress enacted the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Section 214(d) of  which provides that, “[f]or purposes of  the registra-
tion of  birth, certification of  nationality, or issuance of  a passport of  a United States citizen born in the city 
of  Jerusalem, the Secretary [of  State] shall, upon the request of  the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record 
the place of  birth as Israel.”1 Both the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration declined to comply 
with this statutory directive. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), the Supreme Court sided with the executive 
branch, holding that Section 214(d) unconstitutionally interferes with the exclusive authority of  the President 
to recognize foreign sovereigns.2   
The focus of  this essay is on the Court’s methodology rather than its conclusion. In particular, the focus is 
on the Court’s reliance on the historic practices of  Congress and the executive branch in support of  the Court’s 
finding of  an exclusive presidential recognition power. Reliance on such practice—also known as “historical 
gloss”—is common in constitutional interpretation relating to the separation of  powers. For a variety of  rea-
sons, however, there are unlikely to be many instances in which historical practice will clearly establish an 
exclusive presidential power. In Zivotofsky II, the relevant practice provided clear support only for a power of  
recognition and was ambiguous about whether this power was concurrent or exclusive. The Court’s assessment 
of  the practice, therefore, appears to have been affected by other considerations, such as the Court’s perception 
about the consequences of  adopting a particular interpretation. This is not necessarily an indictment, given that 
a similar dynamic often characterizes other aspects of  constitutional interpretation, including textual analysis. 
It is probably fair to say, however, that whereas in some cases historical practice shapes perceptions about other 
interpretive materials, in Zivotofsky II the principal direction of  influence was the other way around. The decision 
also highlights tensions between a custom-based approach to the separation of  powers and the institution of  
judicial review, tensions that are potentially relevant both to the proper scope of  justiciability doctrines as well 
as to the way in which judicial decisions are best formulated. 
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Jack Goldsmith, Neil Siegel, and Carlos Vázquez. 
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1 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002). 
2 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S.Ct. 2076 (2015) [hereinafter Zivotofsky II]. 
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I. Historical Gloss and the Separation of  Powers 
Historical practice often plays a significant role in assessments of  the Constitution’s distribution of  authority 
among the three federal branches of  government, especially in the area of  foreign affairs.3 Judicial precedent 
tends to be sparse on questions relating to the separation of  powers, and historical practice can provide an 
alternative form of  precedent. Moreover, crediting such practice can be a way of  respecting the constitutional 
judgments of  non-judicial actors. There also can be consequentialist justifications for deferring to practice—
for example, it can be a way of  protecting expectation interests that may have developed in light of  the practice 
and avoiding unanticipated consequences that may stem from deviating from it. 
Reliance on historical practice is especially common in assessments of  presidential power. Part of  the reason 
is that the text of  the Constitution provides relatively little guidance on this topic. Unlike the laundry list of  
congressional powers in Article I, Section 8 of  the Constitution and other constitutional provisions, Article II 
mentions only a few presidential powers, and a number of  the ones it mentions (such as the treaty power) are 
shared with the Senate. By necessity, claims about presidential power often rest on purported implications of  
the few specific textual grants of  authority, inferences from the more general constitutional structure, or the 
controversial idea of  unspecified “residual” powers conveyed through the first sentence of  Article II (“The 
executive Power shall be vested in a President of  the United States of  America.”).4 These materials, however, 
will often be unclear and contested, and historical practice can help support or undermine particular interpre-
tations. 
The now canonical framework for assessing presidential power is the one set forth by Justice Jackson in his 
concurrence in the Youngstown steel seizure case.5 Under this framework, which Jackson acknowledged to be “a 
somewhat over-simplified grouping,”6 presidential power is assessed based on three categories. In the first cat-
egory, in which the President acts with the express or implied authorization of  Congress, his power is “at its 
maximum.”7 In the second category, in which there is neither a congressional grant nor denial of  authority, 
“there is a zone of  twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which 
its distribution is uncertain.”8 In the third category, in which the President takes actions contrary to the express 
or implied will of  Congress, “his power is at its lowest ebb.”9 Justice Jackson recognized that presidential actions 
would still be lawful in the third category to the extent that the President was exercising authority assigned 
exclusively to him by the Constitution, although Justice Jackson cautioned that a claim to such exclusive author-
ity “must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system.”10   
 
3 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of  Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012). 
4 The Supreme Court noted in Zivotofsky II that, because it had concluded that the President’s recognition power was supported by 
specific constitutional text, it “need not consider whether or to what extent the Vesting Clause . . . provides further support for the 
President’s action here.” Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2086. Justice Thomas was the only member of  the Court to endorse a reading of  
the Vesting Clause that would encompass residual powers, see id. at 2097-2098 (Thomas, J., concurring), and Justice Scalia’s dissent 
(joined by Chief  Justice Roberts and Justice Alito) seemed critical of  the idea. See id. at 2126 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to Justice 
Thomas’s “assertion of  broad, unenumerated ‘residual powers’ of  the President”). For differing academic accounts of  the Vesting 
Clause, compare Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001), with Curtis A. 
Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004). 
5 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
6 Id. at 635. 
7 Id.  
8 Id. at 637. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 638. 
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The invocation of  historical practice in discerning the separation of  powers is often identified with a different 
concurrence in Youngstown—the one by Justice Frankfurter. Justice Frankfurter observed that “[i]t is an inad-
missibly narrow conception of  American constitutional law to confine it to the words of  the Constitution and 
to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”11 He also contended that  
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of  the Congress and never 
before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making 
as it were such exercise of  power part of  the structure of  our government, may be treated as a gloss on 
“executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of  Art. II.12  
Not all articulations of  the standards for gloss are as demanding as Frankfurter’s, and in crediting practice 
the Supreme Court has not typically required that it be “unbroken” or “never before questioned.” In addition, 
while Frankfurter referred specifically to the first clause of  Article II of  the Constitution, gloss has been in-
voked to help interpret a variety of  other constitutional clauses, relating both to executive and legislative 
authority, as well as to interpret broader structural principles. 
Whatever the appropriate text, such “historical gloss” is potentially relevant to all three of  Justice Jackson’s 
categories. It is most obviously relevant to his second, “zone of  twilight” category, where the distribution of  
authority is especially uncertain. But it is also potentially relevant to the first and third categories. Those cate-
gories refer to the implied as well as express will of  Congress, and, as the Supreme Court has recognized, 
historical practice can help inform what Congress has implicitly authorized or disapproved.13 Of  most relevance 
to Zivotofsky II, practice can also, at least in theory, help an interpreter identify when Congress has exceeded its 
authority or intruded upon the exclusive authority of  the President—issues of  particular concern under Justice 
Jackson’s third, “lowest ebb” category.  
Although the Supreme Court has endorsed the relevance of  historical gloss to the separation of  powers in a 
number of  decisions, its decision last Term in NLRB v. Noel Canning provided an especially strong endorsement 
of  this approach to constitutional interpretation.14 In concluding that the President’s power to make recess 
appointments applied even during “intra-session” recesses of  the Senate, and even when the vacancy that was 
being filled pre-dated the recess, the Court in Noel Canning accorded what it described as “significant weight” 
to historical practice relating to the recess appointments power.15 The Court made clear that “[t]he longstanding 
‘practice of  the government,’ . . . can inform this Court’s determination of  ‘what the law is’ in a separation-of-
powers case.”16  
 
11 Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
12 Id. at 610-11. 
13 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531-32 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion); Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981). 
14 NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
15 Id. at 2559 (citations omitted). 
16 Id. at 2559-60. For analysis of  this decision, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, 
and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
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II. Historical Gloss in Zivotofsky II 
In Zivotofsky II, the Court referred to Noel Canning and noted that, “[h]aving examined the Constitution’s text 
and this Court’s precedent, it is appropriate to turn to accepted understandings and practice.”17 While acknowl-
edging that the practice relating to recognition was “not all on one side,” the Court thought that, “on balance 
it provides strong support for the conclusion that the recognition power is the President’s alone.”18  
Whether the practice cited by the Court provided “strong support” is questionable. There is little dispute 
that the practice supported a presidential power to make determinations concerning the recognition of  foreign 
sovereigns and their territory. It is much less clear, however, that the practice established that this recognition 
power was exclusive, such that it could not be regulated by Congress.19 During the nineteenth century, there 
was uncertainty and dispute about whether and to what extent Congress could regulate issues relating to recog-
nition. Congress sometimes declined to take contemplated action concerning recognition in the face of  
executive branch opposition (for example, relating to South American countries in the early nineteenth cen-
tury),20 but it is not clear whether this restraint was the result of  policy concerns or constitutional doubts (and 
different members of  Congress may of  course have had different motivations). Conversely, presidents some-
times accommodated congressional preferences about recognition (for example, President Jackson’s 
accommodation of  Congress’s desire to recognize Texas in the 1830s, and President Lincoln’s solicitation of  
Congress’s views regarding the recognition of  Haiti and Liberia in 1861),21 but it is not clear whether they did 
so for political or constitutional reasons. 
To be sure, the practice since the early twentieth century has been primarily one of  executive branch man-
agement of  recognition issues, without much objection from Congress. As the Court noted in Zivotofsky II, 
“[o]ver the last 100 years, there has been scarcely any debate over the President’s power to recognize foreign 
states.”22 By itself, however, this modern history merely supports a unilateral presidential recognition power, 
not necessarily an exclusive recognition power. While Congress’s general lack of  regulation of  recognition in 
this period might stem from a congressional acceptance of  exclusive presidential authority, it might also stem 
simply from the fact that Congress has not generally disagreed with the President’s actions. 
The ambiguous nature of  the practice does not necessarily mean that the Court reached the wrong conclu-
sion. Customary practices are never self-defining; they always must be interpreted and categorized. That is, 
applications of  constitutional custom, like applications of  customary international law, involve an element of  
law-creation, akin to the judicial development of  the common law.23 Determinations of  constitutional custom, 
moreover, are inevitably affected by other “modalities” of  constitutional interpretation, including the inter-
preter’s views about the constitutional structure and about the consequences of  a particular interpretation. This 
was evident in Zivotofsky II: the Court emphasized structural inferences and what it referred to as “functional 
 
17 Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2091. 
18 Id.  
19 See Robert J. Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power Exclusive?, 86 TEMPLE L. REV. 1 (2013). Reinstein concludes that historical 
practice “provides little support for any claim of an exclusive recognition power,” id. at 8, although he also acknowledges that “[a] possible 
interpretation of the post-ratification history is that Congress cannot overturn an executive recognition decision but can take other 
actions that determine the policies by which the recognition is effectuated,” id. at 56 n. 370. 
20 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2092. 
21 See id. at 2092-2093. 
22 Id. at 2094. 
23 Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE:  INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD (Curtis A. Bradley ed., forthcoming) (describing how the interpretation of  customary international law in 
international adjudication often resembles common law decisionmaking). 
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considerations” in support of  an exclusive presidential recognition power, and it interpreted congressional in-
action relating to recognition as reflecting an acceptance of  these inferences and considerations.24 The 
interdependence of  interpretive materials in constitutional interpretation is not unique to historical gloss.25   
It seems fair to say, however, that whereas in some cases (such as Noel Canning) historical practice shapes 
perceptions about other interpretive materials, in Zivotofsky II it was largely the other way around. If  history 
were the only relevant consideration, the Court easily could have concluded that the presidential recognition 
power was concurrent rather than exclusive. Nevertheless, it would be going too far to conclude from this that 
the Court’s reference to historical practice in Zivotofsky II was mere window dressing. The post-nineteenth cen-
tury practice concerning recognition was dominated by the executive branch, and this fact helped to reinforce 
the Court’s finding of  exclusivity, even though it was not by itself  sufficient to sustain that conclusion. History 
mattered, but it mattered less than it did in Noel Canning, and it was not the only thing that mattered. 
The ambiguous nature of  the historical practice in Zivotofsky II also reveals a more general issue: although 
historical practice is in theory relevant to Jackson’s third category, it is likely to be difficult to find clear historical 
evidence supporting an exclusive presidential power.26 Among other things, there are not many instances like 
the one in Zivotofsky II in which presidents directly defy clear statutory directives. Instead, the political branches 
generally find a way to resolve their disputes without a constitutional impasse. Before the enactment of  Section 
214(d), this had been true about recognition. As the Court observed in Zivotofsky II, “[u]ntil today, the political 
branches have resolved their disputes over questions of  recognition.”27 The closest analogue to Section 214(d) 
was Congress’s directive in the 1990s that the executive branch allow U.S. citizens born in Taiwan to have their 
place of  birth recorded as “Taiwan.”28 But that measure was distinguishable from Section 214(d) because it did 
not take a position on whether Taiwan was part of, or separate from, mainland China, whereas Section 214(d) 
specifically linked Jerusalem to Israel.29 
Despite its limitations, historical gloss seems more established than ever as part of  the Supreme Court’s 
approach to constitutional interpretation concerning the separation of  powers. Notably, even the Justices who 
did not join the majority opinion in Zivotofsky II accepted the relevance of  post-Founding historical practice. 
Justice Thomas, in arguing that the President’s recognition power stemmed from the Article II Vesting Clause, 
invoked not only originalist materials but also the “President’s longstanding practice of  exercising unenumer-
ated foreign affairs powers,” as well as “[t]he history of  the President’s passport regulation in this country.”30 
Chief  Justice Roberts also seemed to accept some role for historical practice, although he insisted that it did 
not show that Congress had accepted an exclusive presidential recognition power.31 Justice Scalia, in contesting 
the Court’s conclusion that Section 214(d) unconstitutionally interfered with the President’s recognition power, 
 
24 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2079, 2086. 
25 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213 (2015); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of  Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987). 
26 Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 825 (2014) (finding that, while modern historical 
practice supported a unilateral presidential power of  treaty termination, “there is no significant historical practice to support the Exec-
utive Branch’s claim” that such a power is exclusive). 
27 Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2088. 
28 See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 132, 108 Stat. 395. 
29 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2107 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Because the President otherwise treats Taiwan as a geographical 
area within the People’s Republic of China, listing Taiwan as the place of birth did not directly conflict with the President’s prevailing 
practices.”). 
30 Id. at 2097, 2102 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
31 See id. at 2114 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief  Justice Roberts also suggested that congressional acquiescence should not be 
credited in discerning exclusive presidential authority. See id. But cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163 (1926) (relying in part on 
congressional acquiescence in support of  an exclusive presidential power of  removal of  executive officers). 
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argued that “Congress has legislated without regard to recognition for a long time and in a range of  settings.”32 
In addition, in contesting Justice Thomas’s claim that Congress lacked affirmative authority to regulate pass-
ports, Justice Scalia emphasized that, since the Civil War, “Congress has made laws about eligibility to receive 
passports, the duration for which passports remain valid, and even the type of  paper used to manufacture 
passports.”33 
III. Judicial Review and Historical Gloss 
The Supreme Court is not a mere neutral reporter on the customary practices of  the political branches. Its 
decisions also shape those practices. In Zivotofsky II, by holding that the President has an exclusive recognition 
power, the Supreme Court has affected how future practices between the political branches will develop. 
This dynamic serves as a reminder of  an inherent tension between a custom-based approach to law and 
centralized judicial review. One of  the potential virtues of  custom is that it can evolve in response to changing 
conditions. This is true of  customary practice relating to the separation of  powers, in that this practice can (at 
least under certain conditions) evolve based on the political branches’ own assessments of  what works best 
over time. Judicial review, however, has the potential to freeze in place a particular arrangement and thereby 
prevent further evolution. In part because of  another custom—judicial supremacy—institutional actors in the 
United States are likely to coordinate around Supreme Court determinations.34 
A freezing of  customary evolution is not necessarily problematic. Sometimes the benefits of  a clear judicial 
resolution will outweigh the benefits of  continuing flexibility. The Court in Zivotofsky II suggested that it thought 
this was the case with respect to the exclusivity of  the recognition power. “A clear rule that the formal power 
to recognize a foreign government subsists in the President,” the Court reasoned, “serves a necessary purpose 
in diplomatic relations.”35 The Court observed, for example, that other countries needed clear notice of  whether 
they would receive the benefits of  recognition by the United States, and that having a clear understanding of  
the President’s exclusive authority with respect to this issue would benefit the United States in international 
negotiations over matters relating to recognition.  
With respect to determinations of  presidential power, however, a judicial intervention has the potential to 
entrench expansions of  presidential authority that have developed over time. Commentators concerned about 
the growth of  presidential power often suggest greater judicial review as a corrective. But if  judicial review 
simply results in a confirmation of  executive authority, the President’s position may be stronger than if  the 
courts had abstained. This is a plausible understanding of  what happened in the Zivotofsky II litigation. If  the 
Supreme Court had declined to decide the constitutional question, based on lack of  standing or the political 
question doctrine, Congress would have been able to continue making a credible claim of  authority to enact 
statutory directives like the one in Section 214(d). Zivotofsky II, however, substantially reduces Congress’s ability 
to make such a claim. The decision, moreover, is likely to serve as a useful precedent for the executive branch 
both in its internal reasoning and in other disputes with Congress.36 
More generally, Zivotofsky II suggests that the Supreme Court’s approach to justiciability cannot be entirely 
separated from its approach to the merits. In particular, if  the Court adopts a formalist approach to justiciability, 
 
32 Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2122 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 2125 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
34 For a comparable issue concerning international adjudication of customary international law, see Suzanne Katzenstein, International 
Adjudication and Custom Breaking by Domestic Courts, 62 DUKE L.J. 671, 673 (2012) (“[F]or a specific class of cases—those involving custom 
breaking—international adjudication risks impeding the traditional process by which [customary international law] evolves.”) 
35 Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2088. 
36 See Jack Goldsmith, Why Zivotofsky is a Significant Victory for the Executive Branch, LAWFARE (June 8, 2015, 3:44 PM). 
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and thereby suppresses prudential considerations at that stage, it is quite possible that these considerations will 
reemerge at the merits stage.37 Thus, in the first Zivotofsky II decision, the Court adopted a very formalist ap-
proach to the political question doctrine, declining even to mention the prudential factors outlined in Baker v. 
Carr (such as “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the poten-
tiality of  embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”). 
Prudential concerns became a significant part of  the analysis, however, when the Court addressed the merits 
in Zivotofsky II. As a result, a prudential approach to non-justiciability should not necessarily be viewed as in-
herently favoring the growth of  executive authority. 
That said, the tension between judicial review and a custom-based approach to law can be reduced by judicial 
approaches other than non-justiciability. In particular, the Supreme Court can seek to minimize the entrench-
ment effect of  its decisions by engaging in what Cass Sunstein has labeled “judicial minimalism.”38 Such an 
approach would involve, among other things, framing a decision narrowly in terms that fit closely to the par-
ticular facts of  the dispute, thereby preserving maximum space for customary evolution on potentially related 
issues. The Court in Zivotofsky II appears to have attempted to do precisely that. It expressly resolved only “the 
power to recognize or decline to recognize a foreign state and its territorial bounds,” and it made clear that it 
was finding historic congressional acquiescence in exclusive presidential power only “in the narrow context of  
recognition.”39 The Court also emphasized that “[t]he Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and 
checks of  Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue,” and that “Congress has an important role in 
other aspects of  foreign policy, and the President may be bound by any number of  laws Congress enacts.”40 In 
addition, the Court declined to rest its decision on the broad presidential power dicta in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corporation,41 noting that “[a] formulation broader than the rule that the President alone deter-
mines what nations to formally recognize as legitimate . . . presents different issues and is unnecessary to the 
resolution of  this case.”42   
Of  course, it is possible that the Court could have been even more minimalist in its decision. In particular, 
it could have concluded, as Zivotofsky argued, that Section 214(d) did not interfere with the President’s recog-
nition policy concerning Jerusalem, and thereby avoided deciding whether the President had an exclusive 
recognition power. Particularly given the sensitive Middle East backdrop of  the case, however, it is not surpris-
ing that the Court gave some deference to the executive branch’s contrary assessment of  Section 214(d)’s 
effect.43  
 
37 See Curtis A. Bradley, Zivotofsky and Pragmatic Foreign Relations Law, SCOTUSBLOG (June 9, 2015, 9:16 AM). 
38 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006). 
39 Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2094. 
40 Id. at 2088. 
41 See id. at 2089. 
42 Id.. The Court’s disavowal of the Curtiss-Wright dicta and its endorsement of congressional authority in foreign affairs caused some 
commentators to see the decision as potentially serving to limit rather than expand presidential authority. See, e.g., Michael Dorf, Zivotofsky 
May be Remembered as Limiting Exclusive Presidential Power, DORF ON LAW (June 8, 2015, 12:52 PM); Michael J. Glennon, Recognizable Power: 
The Supreme Court Deals a Blow to Executive Authority, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SNAPSHOT (June 23, 2015). 
43 The Court’s deference to the executive branch concerning the likely affect of  enforcing Section 214(d) on U.S. foreign relations 
was subtle. In concluding that the statute had the effect of  contradicting the executive branch’s recognition policy concerning Jerusalem, 
the Court quoted the D.C. Circuit’s finding to that effect. See Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2080. The D.C. Circuit’s finding in turn reflected 
deference to the executive branch. See Zivotofsky v. Secretary of  State, 725 F.3d 197, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“We find the Secretary’s 
detailed explanation of  the conflict between section 214(d) and Executive recognition policy compelling, especially given ‘our customary 
policy to accord deference to the President in matters of  foreign affairs.’”) (citation omitted). During the oral argument in Zivotofsky II, 
Justice Kennedy, who ended up writing the majority opinion, indicated that he thought deference was appropriate. See Transcript of  
Argument, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 13-628, at 18-19 (Nov. 3, 2014). 
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Conclusion 
Zivotofsky II provides additional confirmation of  the relevance of  the “historical gloss” approach to consti-
tutional interpretation, both in the general area of  separation of  powers and in the more specific area of  foreign 
relations law. At the same time, the decision highlights some of  the limitations of  this approach, especially for 
resolving direct conflicts between Congress and the executive branch, as well as certain tensions between a 
practice-based approach to constitutional interpretation and the institution of  judicial review. To its credit, the 
Court in Zivotofsky II was sensitive to these limitations and tensions. 
 
